Case: 21-51178 Document: 00516474571 Page: 27 Date Filed: 09/16/2022 No. 21-51178 conduct” and was nothing like a “Government-mandated pledge or motto” as in Barnette and Wooley. Id. at 62. Congress could therefore compel this “incidental” speech without violating the First Amendment. Ibid. The Court then held that the Solomon Amendment did not impermissibly interfere with the schools’ own speech, distinguishing Miami Herald, PG&E, and Hurley. Id. at 63–65. It acknowledged that those three cases “limited the government’s ability to force one speaker to host or accommodate another speaker’s message.” Id. at 63. But it then explained that these “compelled-speech violation[s] . . . resulted from the fact that the complaining speaker’s own message was affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate.” Ibid.; see also id. at 63–64 (explaining how the challenged laws “interfere[d] with a speaker’s desired message” in Miami Herald, PG&E, and Hurley). In Rumsfeld, by contrast, “accommodating the military’s message [did] not affect the law schools’ speech, because the schools [were] not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting receptions.” Id. at 64. That was true despite the risk that students might mistakenly interpret the law schools’ conduct as sending the message that they see nothing wrong with the military’s policies. Id. at 64–65. In sum, even though it required law schools to host and accommodate others’ speech, the Solomon Amendment was constitutional because it “neither limit[ed] what law schools may say nor require[d] them to say anything.” Id. at 60. 2. Under these precedents, a speech host must make one of two showings to mount a First Amendment challenge. It must show that the challenged law either (a) compels the host to speak or (b) restricts the host’s own speech. The Platforms cannot make either showing. And (c) the Platforms’ counterarguments are unpersuasive. 27