5. The remedy for the First Amendment violation is to invalidate Minn. Stat. § 617.261. Having determined that Minn. Stat. § 617.261 is overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, we consider whether applying a narrowing construction or severing problematic language from the statute would remedy the constitutional defect. A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 848. When a court determines that a statute is unconstitutional, it must invalidate as much of the statute as is necessary to eliminate the unconstitutionality. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State, 315 N.W.2d 597, 600 (Minn. 1982). We look to the intent of the legislature to fashion a remedy consistent with that intent. Id. “[W]e are not to sever a statute if the remaining valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent.” A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 848 (quotation omitted). Although we can strike a severable statutory provision if it is unconstitutional and void, “we cannot add language to a statute in order to render it constitutionally permissible.” Chapman v. Comm’r of Revenue, 651 N.W.2d 825, 836 (Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted). The state argues that Minn. Stat. § 617.261 is subject to a limiting construction that can remedy its constitutional defect. For example, the state suggests that we construe the statute to refer only to obscenity. But limiting the statute’s application to obscenity is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, which defines the images subject to regulation much more broadly than the recognized definition of obscenity, indicating that the legislature did not intend such a limitation. 26