Amendment establishes that the government generally may not restrict expression because of its messages, ideas, subject matter, or content. Id. The First Amendment’s protections extend beyond expressions regarding matters of public concern, and “First Amendment principles apply with equal force to speech or expressive conduct on the Internet.” Id. “The [Supreme] Court has applied similarly conceived First Amendment standards to moving pictures, to photographs, and to words in books.” Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119, 93 S. Ct. 2680, 2684 (1973). The state concedes, and we agree, that Minn. Stat. § 617.261 restricts expressive conduct. Casillas contends that Minn. Stat. § 617.261 is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. To succeed in a typical facial constitutional challenge, a challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the challenged statute would be valid or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010). But in the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court has recognized a second type of facial challenge, whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. at 473, 130 S. Ct. at 1587 (quotation omitted). Thus, a long-recognized exception to the ordinary rules of standing applies to facial overbreadth challenges. State v. Mireles, 619 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. App. 2000) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2916 (1973)), review denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 2001). Under this exception, litigants may challenge a statute, “not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because ‘the statute’s very 5