SPECIAL COLLECTION OF THE CASE LAW ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION The order was issued as a preventive measure in the context of criminal proceedings against the owner of a site hosted in the mentioned service, who was accused of insulting the memory of Atatürk. Yildirim applied before the national courts to have the blocking order of 24 June 2009 set aside in respect of his website. He pointed out that he used the website regularly in order to publish his academic work and his opinions on various topics, and that the measure had barred all access to his site, which had no connection with the offending website. The Court considered that the only means of blocking access to the latter, in accordance with the blocking order, had been to block access to the Google Sites service, which had hosted the content complained of. In particular, where a court ordered the blocking of access to a specific website, it fell to the TIB to implement the measure. If the content provider or hosting service provider is abroad (as it was the case), the TİB may block all access to the pages of the intermediary service provider under section 8(3) and (4) of Law no. 5651. This is obviously not a case of wholesale blocking of internet access, even though it is particularly relevant since the decision of State authorities affected a significant amount of internet users and prevented access to fully legal online content. In the words of the ECtHR, “the fact that the effects of the restriction in issue were limited does not diminish its significance, especially since the Internet has now become one of the principal means by which individuals exercise their right to freedom of expression and information, providing as it does essential tools for participation in activities and discussions concerning political issues and issues of general interest.” The ECtHR stresses that the right to freedom of expression enshrined in article 10 ECHR “applies not only to the content of information but also to the means of dissemination, since any restriction imposed on the latter necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart information”. The Court also considers that national judgements “simply found it established that the only means of blocking access to the offending website in accordance with the order made to that effect was to block all access to Google Sites.” However, “they should have taken into consideration, among other elements, the fact that such a measure, by rendering large quantities of information inaccessible, substantially restricted the rights of internet users and had a significant collateral effect.” Furthermore, the Court establishes the violation of article 10 ECHR mainly based on the argument that “the judicial review procedures concerning the blocking of Internet sites are insufficient to meet the criteria for avoiding abuse, as domestic law does not provide for any safeguards to ensure that a blocking order in respect of a specific site is not used as a means of blocking access in general.” Even though, as already mentioned, the ECtHR was not dealing with a complete internet shutdown, some interesting guiding principles were established: a) The internet has now become one of the principal means by which individuals exercise their right to freedom of expression and information. b) Restrictions that affect a significant amount of internet users and prevent access to fully legal online content must be particularly considered by competent authorities as they have a significant “collateral effect”. 26