SPECIAL COLLECTION OF THE CASE LAW ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION addition to this, the Court noted that the maximum duration of suspension orders had not been indicated. Nonetheless, considering the principle of proportionality, the Court opined that an indefinite suspension is impermissible and that it was up to the previously mentioned Review Committee to determine its duration and to ensure that it would not extend beyond a period which was necessary. Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure additionally grants special powers to governmental authorities, under judicial supervision, to adopt measures in circumstances of “danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquility, or a riot, of an affray.” The Court concluded that the power under Section 144 could be exercised “not only where there exists present danger, but also when there is an apprehension of danger. However, the danger contemplated should be in the nature of an ‘emergency’ and for the purpose of preventing obstruction and annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed.” The Court observes that the petitioners had failed to offer evidence that the restrictions had any actual repercussion as well as any chilling effect on their freedom of expression. However, it also stated that competent authorities are required to respect the freedom of the press at all times, and that “there is no justification for allowing a sword of Damocles to hang over the press indefinitely.” For all these reasons, the Court decided that the government had to review its suspension orders, particularly those that could be used to suppress legitimate expression, and lift those that were not necessary or did not have a temporal limit. This judgement is important beyond its jurisdiction as it frames a series of very relevant principles that have been further utilized by the courts in the country as well as in other jurisdictions for comparative purposes. The main principles deriving from the decision are: a) The right to freedom of expression also extends to the internet as a medium for expression, although the Court does not proclaim access to the internet as a fundamental right. b) Restrictions to freedom of expression, including access to the internet, can be imposed as long as the limitations are prescribed by law, are reasonable, and pursue a legitimate purpose. c) Even in cases where national security is alleged to justify restrictions to internet access, this would not per se justify not providing access to information regarding the specific decisions adopted by the competent authorities. d) Restrictions should not excessively burden free speech and the relevant authority must properly justify before the Court that lesser alternatives would be inadequate. e) Public authorities have the burden to demonstrate and clearly present the concurrence of circumstances, in terms of national security or others, that may justify the adoption of restrictive measures. 34