c) Immediately the E1 link was established, ETKL received TAP files from their roaming partners in Dubai claiming Kshs 753,844.66 for roaming calls between 1st and 3rd November 2009; d) That the number that originated the roaming call in Dubai was seen in the VLR in Kenya 2 hours before it allegedly made the call in Dubai as a roaming number. Therefore the number could not have physically roamed into a Dubai network which is at least 4 hours flight away; e) That the numbers are ordinary ETKL’s subscriber numbers not attributable to ACL; f) That the details of the roaming calls were not seen in any part of ETKL’s systems or their international carriers including the E1 link between them and ACL; g) That pre-paid ETKL subscribers are barred from roaming and therefore no roaming bills were expected from roaming partners in this regard. That for this to have occurred, there was fraudulent activity being carried out in their network; h) That once the fraudulent activity was noticed, ACL was identified as the newest entrant in ETKL’s network and that they could have been the source of the fraud. A decision was then taken to disconnect the E1 link after which the alleged fraudulent activity stopped; i) That ACL used the link for the fraudulent activities that cost ETKL a loss of Kshs753,844.66 in three days; j) The suspected practice of call back scenario given through ETKL’s written Submissions of 6th January 2009 was articulated as follows: i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. B party calls access number +254 751362050; ACL Initiates call-back through internet to an ISP provider in Dubai; The call is dropped but Dubai gets all call details & calls back through DU GSM Network (local call); This call generates a TAP file payable by ETKL; Through the internet, the call gets terminated in ACL Kenya; and ACL Kenya delivers the call to ETKL through E1 connection. ACL SUBMISSIONS Page 6 of 11