03/02/2020 US v. Ganias, 755 F. 3d 125 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 2014 - Google Scholar [8] See generally United States v. Jones, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012) (considering whether placing GPS tracking unit on vehicle constitutes search); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (determining whether use of thermal imaging constitutes search); United States v. Aguiar, 737 F.3d 251 (2d Cir.2013) (determining whether warrantless placement of GPS tracking unit on vehicle fell within good-faith exception to exclusionary rule); United States v. Galpin, 720 F.3d 436 (2d Cir.2013) (analyzing whether warrant to search computer satisfies particularity requirement); Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv. L.Rev. 531 (2005); James Saylor, Note, Computers as Castles: Preventing the Plain View Doctrine from Becoming a Vehicle for Overbroad Digital Searches, 79 Fordham L.Rev. 2809 (2011); Marc Palumbo, Note, How Safe Is Your Data?: Conceptualizing Hard Drives Under the Fourth Amendment, 36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 977 (2009). [9] The Supreme Court has explained that Entick was "undoubtedly familiar to every American statesman at the time the Constitution was adopted, and considered to be the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law with regard to search and seizure." Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 949 (internal quotation marks omitted). [10] Rule 41(e)(2)(B) provides: Warrant Seeking Electronically Stored Information. A warrant under Rule 41(e)(2)(A) may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored information. Unless otherwise specified, the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent with the warrant. The time for executing the warrant in Rule 41(e)(2)(A) and (f)(1)(A) refers to the seizure or on-site copying of the media or information, and not to any later off-site copying or review. FED.R.CRIM.P. 41(e)(2)(B). [11] The Supreme Court has abrogated Silverthorne's broad proposition that wrongfully acquired evidence may "not be used at all." See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 624-25, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980) (noting that this evidence may be used for purposes of impeachment); see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988) (explaining that the "independent source" doctrine allows the admission of "evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality"); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (explaining that "inevitable discovery" doctrine permits the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence if "th[at] information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means"). The Government does not rely on any of these exceptions here. Indeed, it concedes that if it "had not preserved that data from the November 2003 seizure, it would have been lost forever." Appellee's Br. at 33. We do not hold that the Government has waived its right to use the evidence in question for impeachment purposes. Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar. https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16926744034394821172&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr 11/11