documents or things, and that there is a real possibility that they may destroy such material before any application inter parties can be made. Lord Denning M.R. added in his Judgment that — ―This is an equitable, discretionary remedy.‖ While ORMROD L.J. pointed out in his Judgment that ―Such orders therefore will rarely be made and only when there is no alternative way of ensuring that Justice is done to the Applicant.‖ Counsel for the Applicant chose to argue his case for both orders together. Let me start with the application for Temporary Injunction. The said temporary injunction was made under section 38(1) of the Judicature Act [Cap 13], which states ―The High Court shall have power to grant an injunction to restrain any person from doing any act as may be specified by the High Court.‖ And section 39 (2) of the same Act which states ―Where in any case no procedure is laid down for the High Court by any written law or by practice, the Court may, in its discretion, adopt a procedure justifiable by the circumstances of the case.‖ Reference is also made to Section 98 of the Civil Procedure Act (Cap 71) which involves the inherent powers of the court. I take it that the Applicant cited these sections because in their view there were not provisions in our law that covered the procedure for in the first instance their application for a temporary injunction ex parte. A review of the law of Uganda however brings to mind two immediate possibilities. The first possible procedure is under our Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) Order 37, which provides for how a party may apply to get a temporary injunction. This is an interlocutory application the granting of which is normally based on Giella Case (Supra) that has already been cited. The