12 EINARSSON v. ICELAND JUDGMENT discussions about his professional activities and the complaints against him of sexual violence. Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated: “When the [applicant] appeared in the aforementioned newspaper interview and employed provocative, if not derogatory, comments about others, including the girl who had accused him of sexual violence, he launched a public debate and should, moreover, have known that his comments would result in strong reactions from those who strongly disliked his abovementioned views”. The Court agrees with the domestic courts that, in the light of the fact that the applicant was a well-known person and the impugned statement was a part of a debate concerning accusations of a serious criminal act, it was an issue of general interest. The Court will now examine whether, due to the content, form and consequences of the impugned publication the national courts struck a fair balance between the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention and X’s rights under Article 10. (iii) Content, form and consequences of the impugned publication 46. The Supreme Court, in its judgment of 20 November 2014, stated that the altered picture along with the caption had been accessible not only to X’s followers on Instagram, but to other users of the medium as well. The court concluded that, either way, it had been made available publicly and therefore came under Article 236 of the Penal Code. The Court sees no reason to disagree with the Supreme Court’s assessment on this point. In that respect the Court deems important to recall its previous case-law where it has recognised that in the light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information in general. At the same time, the risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is certainly higher than that posed by the press (see, inter alia, Delfi AS v. Estonia, § 133, cited above).” 47. The crux of the matter before the domestic courts was whether or not the statement “Fuck you rapist bastard” had been a statement of fact or a value judgment. The majority of the Supreme Court, in its judgment, stated: “Although it can be agreed that by using the term ‘rapist’ about a named person, that person is being accused of committing rape, account must be taken of the context in which the term is set, cf. the ruling of the Supreme Court on 29 January 2009 in Case No 321/2008. If the altered picture and the comment ‘Fuck you rapist bastard’ are taken as a whole – as the parties agree should be the case – the Supreme Court agrees with the District Court that this was a case of invective on the part of [X] against the [applicant] in a ruthless public debate, which the latter, as stated previously, had instigated. It was therefore a value judgment about the [applicant] and not a factual statement that he was guilty of committing rape. In this context, it