26. Although the Defendant posted the Messages in his private home using his computer, other members of the public could view their contents through the internet. Hence, according to the proposition established in R v Walker (S), ibid (see paragraph 25(ii) above), the Defendant’s act of posting the Messages should be regarded as an act committed in public. Further, the Defendant had the intention to publish the Messages, and so there is no dispute that the Defendant had the necessary mens rea for the offence. The remaining main issue is, therefore, whether the Defendant’s act was of such a lewd, obscene or disgusting character as constitutes an outrage on public decency. Whether the Defendant’s act was one outraging public decency? 27. In this regard, guidance can be obtained from the judgment of the House of Lords in Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v DPP, ibid. In that case, the appellants were directors of a company which published a fortnightly magazine. In an inside page under a column headed “Males”, advertisements were inserted inviting readers to meet the advertisers for the purpose of homosexual practices. For such conduct, the appellants were charged with and convicted of the first count of conspiracy to corrupt public morals and the second count of conspiracy to outrage public decency. In the House of Lords, the Law Lords affirmed the conviction on the first count but quashed the conviction on the second count. 28. In respect of the charge of conspiracy to outrage public decency, the majority, including Lord Morris, Lord Simon and Lord Kilbrandon, held that such an offence did exist in common law, whilst Lord Reid 11