(ii) it must be proved that the act complained of was committed in public, which means that it must be committed in a place, public or private, where there exists a real possibility that members of the general public might witness it (see: R v Walker (S) [1996] 1 Cr App R 111); (iii) the prosecution also has to prove that the act complained of was of such a lewd, obscene or disgusting character as constitutes an outrage on public decency, which is a question of fact to be decided by the trial judge, or in the case of a jury trial, by the jury; (iv) it is not necessary for the prosecution further to prove that the act in fact disgusted or annoyed the persons within whose purview it was committed (see: Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd v DPP, ibid.). Although it is free for the prosecution to adduce evidence to that effect, ultimately it is a question for the trial judge or the jury to decide whether an act is one outraging public decency; and (v) for the mens rea, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove an intention to outrage or recklessness. The prosecution merely has to prove that the defendant had the intention to do the act which outrages public decency, whatever the defendant himself might think its likely effect might be (see: R v Gibson and Sylveire, ibid.). 10