Justice K.S.Puttaswamy(Retd) vs Union Of India on 26 September, 2018 379. At the very outset, if a privacy claim specifically flows only from one of the expressly enumerated provisions under Article 19, then the standard of review would be as expressly provided under Article 19. However, the possibility of a privacy claim being entirely traceable to rights other than Article 21 is bleak. Without discounting that possibility, it needs to be noted that Article 21 is the bedrock of the privacy guarantee. If the spirit of liberty permeates every claim of privacy, it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine that any standard of limitation other than the one under Article 21 applies. It is for this reason that I will restrict the available options to the latter two from the above described four. 380. The just, fair and reasonable standard of review under Article 21 needs no elaboration. It has also most commonly been used in cases dealing with a privacy claim hitherto. [District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC 496 : AIR 2005 SC 186] , [State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 5] Gobind [Gobind v. State of M.P., (1975) 2 SCC 148 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 468] resorted to the compelling State interest standard in addition to the Article 21 reasonableness enquiry. From the United States, where the terminology of compelling State interest originated, a strict standard of scrutiny comprises two thingsa compelling State interest and a requirement of narrow tailoring (narrow tailoring means that the law must be narrowly framed to achieve the objective). As a term, compelling State interest does not have definite contours in the US. Hence, it is critical that this standard be adopted with some clarity as to when and in what types of privacy claimsit is to be used. Only in privacy claims which deserve the strictest scrutiny is the standard of compelling State interest to be used. As for others, the just, fair and reasonable standard under Article 21 will apply. When the compelling State interest standard is to be employed, must depend upon the context of concrete cases. However, this discussion sets the ground rules within which a limitation for the right to privacy is to be found. 82) In view of the aforesaid detailed discussion in all the opinions penned by six Honble Judges, it stands established, without any pale of doubt, that privacy has now been treated as part of fundamental rights. The Court has held, in no uncertain terms, that privacy has always been a natural right which gives an individual freedom to exercise control over his or her personality. The judgment further affirms three aspects of the fundamental right to privacy, namely: (i) intrusion with an individuals physical body; (ii) informational privacy; and (iii) privacy of choice. 83) As succinctly put by Nariman, J. first aspect involves the person himself/herself and guards a persons rights relatable to his/her physical body thereby controlling the uncalled invasion by the State. Insofar as the second aspect, namely, informational privacy is concerned, it does not deal with a persons body but deals with a persons mind. In this manner, it protects a person by giving her control over the dissemination of material that is personal to her and disallowing unauthorised use of such information by the State. Third aspect of privacy relates to individuals autonomy by protecting her fundamental personal choices. These aspects have functional connection and Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/127517806/ 85