Justice K.S.Puttaswamy(Retd) vs Union Of India on 26 September, 2018 covered by Article 21: (Kharak Singh case [Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329 : (1964) 1 SCR 332] , AIR p. 1301, para 15) 15. By the term life as here used something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body or amputation of an arm or leg or the putting out of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with the outer world. and this passage was again accepted as laying down the correct law by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the first Sunil Batra case [Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn., (1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 155]. Every limb or faculty through which life is enjoyed is thus protected by Article 21 and a fortiori, this would include the faculties of thinking and feeling. Now deprivation which is inhibited by Article 21 may be total or partial, neither any limb or faculty can be totally destroyed nor can it be partially damaged. Moreover it is every kind of deprivation that is hit by Article 21, whether such deprivation be permanent or temporary and, furthermore, deprivation is not an act which is complete once and for all: it is a continuing act and so long as it lasts, it must be in accordance with procedure established by law. It is therefore clear that any act which damages or injures or interferes with the use of, any limb or faculty of a person, either permanently or even temporarily, would be within the inhibition of Article 21. (emphasis supplied) Privacy is, therefore, necessary in both its mental and physical aspects as an enabler of guaranteed freedoms. 411. It is difficult to see how dignitywhose constitutional significance is acknowledged both by the Preamble and by this Court in its exposition of Article 21, among other rights can be assured to the individual without privacy. Both dignity and privacy are intimately intertwined and are natural conditions for the birth and death of individuals, and for many significant events in life between these events. Necessarily, then, the right to privacy is an integral part of both life and personal liberty under Article 21, and is intended to enable the rights bearer to develop her potential to the fullest extent made possible only in consonance with the constitutional values expressed in the Preamble as well as across Part III. R.F. Nariman, J: 525. But most important of all is the cardinal value of fraternity which assures the dignity of the individual. [ In 1834, Jacques-Charles Dupont de l'Eure associated the three terms liberty, equality and fraternity together in the Revue Républicaine, which he edited, as follows:Any man aspires to liberty, to equality, but he cannot achieve it without the assistance of other men, without fraternity.Many of our decisions recognise human dignity as being an essential part of the fundamental rights chapter. For example, see Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Admn., (1980) 3 SCC 526 at para 21, Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608 at paras 6, 7 and 8, Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161 at para 10, Maharashtra University of Health Sciences v. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal, (2010) 3 SCC 786 at para 37, Shabnam v. Union of India, (2015) 6 SCC 702 at paras 12.4 and 14 and Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 761 at para 37.] The dignity of the individual encompasses the right of the individual to develop to the full extent Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/127517806/ 69