由此 -8- A B C 19. McMahon J concluded that to ‘solicit’ someone for an immoral purpose in terms of section 147(l)(a) included (but was not A B C confined to) enticing or persuading that person to do some act or thing, or D E to seek from them some response, so as to bring about an eventuality or state of affairs which was sexually immoral. Such solicitation need not be D E shown to be “persistent”, nor did it encompass “importuning”, both of F G which elements were requirements in a comparable English provision, section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. Although both s.147(1)(a) F G and s.32 were restricted to sexual offences, s.147(1)(a) was not restricted H H to solicitation by women as was s.32. I I 20. J K Mr Poon, who appeared for the Appellant, relied heavily on J Ollerenshaw v DPP CO/2197/90 5 December 1991, which related to a summons under s.1(1) and (2) of the Sexual Offences Act 1985, which K deals with “kerb crawling”. The driver had stopped his car in a red light L M district and a prostitute shouted, “Do you want to do business?” The driver said, “Yes” and there followed some form of invitation to enter the car, whether by words or gesture or both is not apparent from the report. N O P Q R S T “It seems from the case stated that that which is alleged to have constituted the soliciting was the appellant’s invitation into the car. That that invitation took place is a finding of fact made by the stipendiary magistrate. No objection is made to that and nor could an objection have been made to it. Therefore, the soliciting alleged is the invitation into the car, each of the two persons concerned intending that there should be sexual intercourse.” … “Therefore, one has to look to see what that invitation was. The soliciting necessary to establish the offence is soliciting for the purposes of prostitution. In my judgment, there could, in theory, be soliciting at any time up to the time or even after sexual intercourse. However, if, as I would find, soliciting implies L M N O P Q R S T U U V V