03/02/2020
In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc. :: 2017 :: New York Court of Appeals Decisions :: New York Case Law :: New York Law :: US …
otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider" (id. § 2703 [d]). The primary
question before us in this appeal is whether — assuming, without deciding, the propriety of
a motion to quash an SCA warrant (as opposed to a subsection [d] court order) in the first
instance — an order resolving a motion to quash SCA warrants is appealable.
III.
That the SCA draws a distinction between warrants and subpoenas, and the content that
may be obtained therewith, is of critical significance with respect to a determination of
appellate jurisdiction over the appeal from the denial of Facebook's motion to quash. It is a
fundamental precept of the jurisdiction of our appellate courts that "'[n]o appeal lies from a
determination made in a criminal proceeding unless specifically provided for by statute'"
(People v Lovett, 25 NY3d 1088, 1090 [2015], quoting People v Pagan, 19 NY3d 368, 370
[2012]; see NY Const, art VI, § 3 [b]; People v Bautista, 7 NY3d 838, 838-839 [2006];
People v Hernandez, 98 NY2d 8, 10 [2002]; People v De Jesus, 54 NY2d 447, 449 [1981];
People v Zerillo, 200 NY 443, 446 [1911]). No provision of the Criminal Procedure Law
articles that govern appeals — which are among "'the most highly structured and highly
particularized articles of procedure'" (Hernandez, 98 NY2d at 10, quoting People v Laing,
79 NY2d 166, 171 [1992]) — authorizes an appeal to either an intermediate appellate court
or to this Court from an order denying a motion to quash or vacate a search warrant (see
CPL art 450; CPL 470.60). Moreover, no civil appeal may be brought from an order entered
in a criminal action or proceeding (see NY Const, art VI, § 3 [b]; CPLR 5601; CPL 450.90).
Consequently, we have held for decades that "no appeal lies from [an] order denying . . .
[an] application to vacate a search warrant . . . as this is an order in a criminal [case], [and]
an appeal from [such an order] is not provided for" by statute (Matter of Police Benevolent
Assn. of N.Y. State Police v Gagliardi, 9 NY2d 803, 803-804 [1961] [emphasis added]; see
also Matter of Abe A., 56 NY2d 288, 293 [1982]). By contrast, a motion to quash a
subpoena issued prior to the commencement of a criminal action, even if related to a
criminal investigation, "is civil by nature" (Matter of Abrams [John Anonymous], 62 NY2d
183, 192 [1984]; see Matter of Newsday, Inc., 3 NY3d 651, 652 [2004]; People v Santos, 64
NY2d 702, 704 [1984])[FN3]. Thus, an [*5]order resolving a motion to quash such a
subpoena is a final and appealable order in a special proceeding that is "not subject to the
rule restricting direct appellate review of orders in criminal proceedings" (Matter of
Abrams, 62 NY2d at 192; see Matter of Newsday, 3 NY3d at 651 n).
In the instant matter, Facebook concedes that an order addressing a motion to quash a
warrant is not appealable, but Facebook contends — and the dissent agrees — that, despite
being denominated as "warrants," SCA warrants are more analogous to subpoenas than to
https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2017/16.html
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