Price v. City of N.Y. 15 Civ. 5871 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 25, 2018) would-be forum to be analyzed. Plaintiffs do not seek access to the account as a whole — they do not desire the ability to send tweets as the President, the ability to receive notifications that the President would receive, or the ability to decide who the President follows on Twitter. Because the access they seek is far narrower, we consider whether forum doctrine can be appropriately applied to several aspects of the @realDonaldTrump account rather than the account as a whole: the content of the tweets sent, the timeline comprised of those tweets, the comment threads initiated by each of those tweets, and the "interactive space" associated with each tweet in which other users may directly interact with the content of the tweets by, for example, replying to, retweeting, or liking the tweet. 25 The First Amendment guarantees the right of freedom of speech to individuals and groups; it speaks in strong terms: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." Justice Cardozo called the freedom of speech and thought "the indispensable condition ... of nearly every other form of freedom." Palko v. State of Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Id. at *14. The district court found that the account was "owned or controlled by the Government," and that the act of blocking an individual user from such an account constituted state action. 2018 WL 2327290, at *15. However, it also found that government control did not extend to the comment component of each tweet, which therefore excluded that component from forum analysis. Id. at *16. Additionally, Judge Buchwald found the content and timeline components of the President's Twitter account to be "government speech" as opposed to private speech, and excluded those components as well from forum analysis. Id. at *17-18. For the remaining element, the "interactive space" for replies and retweets, the court found it to be a designated public forum, and found the blocking of users from that space to be impermissible viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. Id. at *20-22. The instant case arises in the very different context of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), where the Court is obligated to credit all well-pleaded allegations of the operative complaint. Plaintiff here alleges that the blocking of her account by @NYPD28Pct, for example, has rendered her unable to use her own Twitter account to view tweets from @NYPD28Pct, to respond to any tweet published by @NYPD28Pct, or to view any other person's responses to tweets by @NYPD28Pct. (FAC ¶¶ 104-05). These disabilities may be broader than those addressed by Judge Buchwald. Moreover, the parties to this case have not framed their arguments in a manner that tracks the analysis in Trump. Given these differences, this Court's analysis will chiefly respond to the parties' arguments. *25 26 The existence of a right of access to public spaces "and the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the [space] at issue." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983); Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2004). In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, the Supreme Court recognized a doctrinal structure for identifying public spaces in which the government is limited, to varying degrees, in its ability to restrict activity covered by the First Amendment. 460 *26 U.S. at 45-47. It divided such spaces into three types of forums: the traditional public forum, the public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum. See id.; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). In evaluating whether a particular space should be classified as a traditional public forum, 12