The order in which a judge chooses to address each of the elements under s. 4(2) is at does not meet its onus as to either s. 4(2)(a) or 4(2)(b). Section 4 is nearly identical to the pretrial screening mechanism established by subss. (3) and (4) of s. 137.1 of Ontario’s Courts of Justice Act: the core feature of both laws is the recognition that even claims with substantial merit will be dismissed where the public interest in preserving free debate outweighs the harm to the plaintiff that the litigation purports to address. Given the substantial similarity between the laws, the Court’s interpretation of s. 137.1 in 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 587, and Bent v. Platnick, 2020 SCC 23, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 645, applies with equal force to s. 4 of the PPPA. Under s. 4(2)(b) of the PPPA, on one side of the public interest weighing exercise, the factor to be considered in favour of the public interest in continuing the proceeding is the likely harm to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s expression. Although general damages are presumed in defamation law, the weighing exercise prescribed by s. 4(2)(b) requires that the harm to the plaintiff be serious enough to outweigh the public interest in protecting the defendant’s expression. While the presumption of damages can establish the existence of harm, it cannot establish that the harm is serious. To succeed on the weighing exercise, a plaintiff must provide evidence that enables the judge to draw an inference of likelihood of harm of a magnitude sufficient 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) the discretion of the court, but the court must dismiss the proceeding if the plaintiff