[129] Defamation lawsuits like the one in the present case call upon courts to protection of one’s reputation (Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, at para. 3; see also Bou Malhab, at para. 19). In determining whether Barry Neufeld’s action in defamation against Glen Hansman should be dismissed at an early stage, our Court must remain mindful of this balance and take great care in not upsetting it (Bent v. Platnick, 2020 SCC 23, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 645, at para. 168). Unfortunately, and I say this with respect, by dismissing Mr. Neufeld’s claim, my colleague fails to do so. [130] In my view, my colleague ventures beyond the narrow confines of the court’s role when disposing of an application made under the PPPA. The purpose of s. 4 of the PPPA, just like that of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”), upon which it was modelled, is to act as a pre-trial screening mechanism (1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 587, at para. 16). In Pointes, our Court cautioned against turning the analysis of a motion under s. 137.1 of the CJA into a de facto summary judgment motion, which would be “insurmountable at this stage of the proceedings” (Pointes, at para. 52; see also para. 38). [131] The same caveat applies to s. 4 of the PPPA given the analogous procedural and evidentiary limitations contained in the statute. For example, an application for a dismissal order can be made any time after the commencement of a proceeding (PPPA, 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) cautiously strike the appropriate balance between freedom of expression and the