Indeed, the Court concluded that the standard could not be so stringent as to prevent analysis under s. 137.1(4) of the CJA: However, while frivolous suits are clearly insufficient, “something more” cannot require a showing that a claim is likely to succeed either, as some parties have posited. Neither the plain meaning nor the legal definition of “substantial” comports with a “likely to succeed” standard. The legislative and statutory context does not support such a standard either. If “substantial merit” requires a showing of being likely to succeed, this could unduly prevent cases from proceeding to the crux of the inquiry that is the weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b). Given the importance of the weighing exercise in the legislative history, this cannot possibly be what the legislature contemplated. Indeed, nothing in the legislative history . . . points to a “likely to succeed” standard as the threshold for the plaintiff to prevail at the merits-based hurdle of s. 137.1. While the plaintiff need not definitively demonstrate that its claim is more likely than not to succeed, the claim must nonetheless be sufficiently strong that terminating it at a preliminary stage would undermine the legislature’s objective of ensuring that a plaintiff with a legitimate claim is not unduly deprived of the opportunity to vindicate that claim. ... Statutory interpretation is a contextual exercise that requires reading a provision with and in light of other provisions: accordingly, if the bar is set too high at s. 137.1(4)(a)(i) or (ii), a motion judge will never reach s. 137.1(4)(b) — this cannot possibly be what the legislature contemplated given the legislative history and intent behind s. 137.1. The legislature repeatedly emphasized proportionality as the paramount consideration in determining whether a lawsuit should be dismissed. Weighing the public interest in freedom of expression and public participation against the public interest in vindicating a meritorious claim is a theme that runs through the entire legislative history, and this informs how s. 137.1 should be judicially understood. [Emphasis added; paras. 48 and 63.] [137] One of the objectives behind s. 137.1 of the CJA and s. 4 of the PPPA alike is to ensure “that a plaintiff with a legitimate claim is not unduly deprived of the 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) cases from getting to the public interest weighing exercise, which is the core of the