[140] I have searched in vain for an explanation in my colleague’s reasons as to Court to do so. Not only did neither the appellant nor the respondent ask our Court to adopt a framework different from the one applied in Pointes, but they both presented their arguments by addressing the merits-based hurdle first and then the public interest hurdle, as they should. The chambers judge and the Court of Appeal also proceeded in this order, as Pointes instructed them to do. The fact that the parties and interveners dedicated most of their submissions to the public interest hurdle is hardly a principled or good reason to change the framework adopted in Pointes. [141] While I recognize that the public interest weighing exercise mandated by s. 4(2)(b) of the PPPA is the “crux” or “core” of the analysis, it must first be established that the underlying claim arises from an expression made by the applicant on a matter of public interest and that it clears the merits-based hurdle (Pointes, at paras. 18 and 61-63; Bent, at para. 139). Ultimately, it is “the public interest in allowing meritorious lawsuits to proceed” that is weighed against “the public interest in protecting expression on matters of public interest” (Pointes, at para. 18 (emphasis added)). [142] Lower court judges may wish to enable proper appellate review and make alternative findings through the public interest weighing exercise even if a claim fails to clear the merits-based hurdle. The proper way to proceed is to follow the approach adopted by our Court in Pointes: first determine whether the claim clears the merits-based hurdle and then address the public interest hurdle (Pointes, at 2023 SCC 14 (CanLII) why she saw fit to reverse the order of the analysis, despite no party having asked the