MADLANGA J [27] Although the focus of this is on searches and seizures, it is very much relevant to the interception of communications. The constitutionally protected right to privacy seeks to be one of the guarantees that South Africa will not again act like the police state that it was under apartheid. Axiomatically, therefore, the right to privacy is singularly important in South Africa’s constitutional democracy. [28] To this, one may add the fact that the invasion of an individual’s privacy infringes the individual’s cognate right to dignity,48 a right so important that it permeates virtually all other fundamental rights.49 About its importance, Ackermann J said “the right to dignity is a cornerstone of our Constitution”.50 And in Hugo this Court quoted the words of L’Heureux-Dube J with approval.51 They are that “inherent human dignity is at the heart of individual rights in a free and democratic society”.52 Importance of the purpose of the limitation [29] The respondents submit that, notwithstanding the magnitude of the incursion into privacy, the purpose and importance of state surveillance render surveillance under RICA reasonable and justifiable. Its purpose is to investigate and combat serious crime, guarantee national security, maintain public order and thereby ensure the safety of the The relationship between the rights to privacy and dignity is highlighted by O’Regan J in Khumalo v Holomisa [2002] ZACC 12; 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC); 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) at para 27: 48 “It should . . . be noted that there is a close link between human dignity and privacy in our constitutional order. The right to privacy, entrenched in section 14 of the Constitution, recognises that human beings have a right to a sphere of intimacy and autonomy that should be protected from invasion. This right serves to foster human dignity.” See Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs; Shalabi v Minister of Home Affairs; Thomas v Minister of Home Affairs [2000] ZACC 8; 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC); 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) at para 35; S v Makwanyane [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at para 328; Chaskalson “The Third Bram Fischer Lecture – Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of our Constitutional Order” (2000) 16 SAJHR 193 at 204. 49 50 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice [1998] ZACC 15; 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC); 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) at para 28. 51 President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo [1997] ZACC 4; 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) (Hugo) at para 41. Egan v Canada [1995] 2 SCR 513 at 543. The words of Chaskalson CJ in Makwanyane above n 49 at para 144 are worth noting: 52 “The rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human rights, and the source of all other personal rights in the [Bill of Rights]. By committing ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of human rights we are required to value these two rights above all others.” 22