10 I confess I do not understand the majority’s view that the section of Fox on changed circumstances, quoted above, is not triggered so long as the agency’s current view of the circumstances is sustainable. Maj. Op. 47. Whatever the soundness of such a view, it seems inapplicable where, as here, the agency explicitly invokes changed circumstances: “Changed factual circumstances cause us to revise our earlier classification of broadband Internet access service.” Order ¶ 330. (c) New reasoning. Perhaps recognizing the frailty of its claims of changed facts, the Commission tries to cover its bases by switching to the alternative approach set forth in Fox, a straightforward disavowal of its prior interpretation of the 1996 Act and related policy views. See, e.g., Order ¶ 360 n.993. The Commission justifies its reclassification almost entirely in terms of arguments that provision of such services as DNS and caching, when provided by a broadband provider, do not turn the overall service into an “information service.” Rather, those functions in its view fit within § 153(24)’s exception for telecommunications systems management. Order ¶ 365-81. Thus, the Commission set for itself a highly technical task of classification, concluding that broadband internet access could fit within the literal terms of the pertinent statutory sections. And it accomplished the task. That it could do so is hardly surprising in view of the broad leeway provided by Brand X, which gave it authority to reverse the policy judgment it had made in the decision there under review, the Declaratory Ruling. But in doing so the Commission performed Hamlet without the Prince—a finding of market power or at least a consideration of competitive conditions. The Declaratory Ruling sustained in Brand X invoked serious economic