97 ¶¶ 281–82. Even if there were any lingering uncertainty about the import of our decision in Verizon, we fully adopt here our findings and analysis in Verizon concerning the existence and permissible scope of the Commission’s section 706 authority, including our conclusion that the Commission’s virtuous cycle theory provides reasonable grounds for the exercise of that authority. That brings us to our colleague’s suggestion that the Order embodies a “central paradox[]” in that the Commission relied on the Telecommunications Act to “increase regulation” even though the Act was “intended to ‘reduce regulation.’” Concurring & Dissenting Op. at 53. We are unmoved. The Act, by its terms, aimed to “encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.” Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–104, 110 Stat 56. If, as we reiterate here (and as the partial dissent agrees), section 706 grants the Commission rulemaking authority, it is unsurprising that the grant of rulemaking authority might occasion the promulgation of additional regulation. And if, as is true here (and was true in Verizon), the new regulation is geared to promoting the effective deployment of new telecommunications technologies such as broadband, the regulation is entirely consistent with the Act’s objectives. B. The Due Process Clause “requires the invalidation of laws [or regulations] that are impermissibly vague.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012). US Telecom argues that the General Conduct Rule falls within that category. We disagree. The General Conduct Rule forbids broadband providers from engaging in conduct that “unreasonably interfere[s] with or unreasonably disadvantage[s] (i) end users’ ability to