Cite as: 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 19 ALITO, J., concurring in judgment groups that are admitted, but not the individuals who are allowed to march as members of admitted groups. Hurley, 515 U. S., at 572–574. In such a case, each of these practices would have to be analyzed separately. 2 Second, the host must use the compilation of speech to express “some sort of collective point”—even if only at a fairly abstract level. Id., at 568. Thus, a parade organizer who claims a First Amendment right to exclude certain groups or individuals would need to show at least that the message conveyed by the groups or individuals who are allowed to march comport with the parade’s theme. Id., at 560, 574. A parade comprising “unrelated segments” that lumber along together willy-nilly would likely not express anything at all. Id., at 576. And although “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection,” compilations that organize the speech of others in a non-expressive way (e.g., chronologically) fall “beyond the realm of expressi[on].” Id., at 569; contra, ante, at 17–18. Our decision in PruneYard illustrates this point. In that case, the Court held that a mall could be required to host third-party speech (i.e., to admit individuals who wanted to distribute handbills or solicit signatures on petitions) because the mall’s admission policy did not express any message, and because the mall was “open to the public at large.” PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 83, 87– 88 (1980); 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U. S. 570, 590 (2023). In such circumstances, we held that the First Amendment is not implicated merely because a host objects to a particular message or viewpoint. See PG&E, 475 U. S., at 12. 3 Finally, a compiler must show that its “own message [is]