ARTICLE 19 GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION its jurisprudence on the similarly worded ECHR provisions on freedom of expression, has developed two fundamental requirements: First, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a “law” unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.18 The second condition requires that legislative measures restricting free expression must truly pursue one of the aims listed in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR, namely the protection of the rights or reputations of others or of national security, public order (ordre public) or public health or morals. The third condition means that even measures which seek to protect a legitimate interest must meet the requisite standard established by the term “necessary.” This is a very strict test: [The adjective ‘necessary’] is not synonymous with “indispensable”, neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as “admissible”, “ordinary”, “useful”, “reasonable” or “desirable”. [It] implies the existence of a “pressing social need.”19 Furthermore, any restriction must restrict freedom of expression as little as possible. 20 The measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question, and they should not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations.21 Vague or broadly defined restrictions, even if they satisfy the “provided by law” criterion, are unacceptable because they go beyond what is strictly required to protect the legitimate interest. Both the UN Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights have on several occasions had to deal with cases in which States have sought to justify restrictions on freedom of expression or other human rights by reference to national security considerations. The UN Human Rights Committee, for example, has made it clear that the onus is on the State seeking to justify a restriction based on grounds of national security by reference to a specific threat. In the case of Jong-Kyu v. Republic of Korea,22 for example, the government had claimed that a national strike in any country would pose a national security and public order. The Committee held that this failed to pass the necessity part of the test. In a similar vein, the European Court has warned that laws that restrict freedom of expression on national security grounds must lay down clear and precise definitions, so as to safeguard against abuse.23 The Court has issued repeated warnings against excessive use Committee). 18 Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 26 April 1979, Application No. 6538/74, para. 49 (European Court of Human Rights). 19 Ibid., para. 59. 20 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 December 1976, Application No. 5493/72, para. 49 (European Court of Human Rights). 21 See R. v. Oakes (1986), 26 DLR (4th) 200, at 227-8, (Canadian Supreme Court). 22 Communication No. 518/1992, views adopted July 1995. 23 See, for example, Klass v. FRG, Application No. 5029/71, 6 September 1978. Memorandum on Jordan’s Protection of State Secrets and Documents Provisional Law No. (50) for the Year 1971ARTICLE 19, London, 2005 – Index Number: LAW/2005/1205 -5-