Judgment No. SC 47/18 Civil Appeal No. SC 695/15 I will now proceed to deal with the remainder of the issues raised by the parties which are:1. Whether or not the subpoena duces tecum is an abuse of court process 2. Whether or not the subpoena duces tecum violates the appellant’s right to privacy 1. Whether or not the subpoena duces tecum is an abuse of court process It is submitted by the appellants that the subpoena was an abuse of court process. The appellants submit that the subpoena itself has nothing to do with the pursuit of the truth and that it is oppressive, thus constituting an abuse of court process. What constitutes abuse of process was discussed in Beinash v Wixley 1997 (3) SA 721 (SCA) by MAHOMMED CJ at 734E-735A as follows: “There can be no doubt that every court is entitled to protect itself and others against an abuse of its processes. Where it is satisfied that the issue of a subpoena in a particular case indeed constitutes an abuse it is quite entitled to set it aside. As was said by De Villiers JA in Hudson v Hudson and Anor 1927 AD 259 at 268: ‘When ... the court finds an attempt made to use for ulterior purposes machinery devised for the better administration of justice, it is the duty of the Court to prevent such abuse.’” Whether a proceeding or certain conduct related thereto constitutes an abuse of the process of the court is a matter which can only be determined by the circumstances of each case. Consequently, there can be no all-encompassing definition of the concept of abuse of processes. However, it can be said in general terms that an abuse of process takes place where the procedures permitted by the Rules of the Court to facilitate the pursuit of the truth are used for a purpose extraneous to that objective. (Standard Credit Corporation Ltd v Bester and Others 1987 (1) SA 812 (W) at 820A-B; Taitz The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (1985) at 16)