Judgment No. SC 47/18 Civil Appeal No. SC 695/15 This provision is clear that derogation from a fundamental right is permissible if two conditions are fulfilled. These are firstly, that it should be prescribed in terms of a law of general application and secondly, that such derogation is fair, reasonable and justifiable in a democratic society. The limitation in casu is prescribed in terms of s 6 (1) and (2) of the Fiscal Appeal Court Act [Chapter 23:05] which gives the court power to summon witnesses, to call for the production of and grant inspection of books and documents and to examine witnesses on oath therefore that requirement of it being prescribed by a law of general application is satisfied. What is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society is a concept which cannot be defined with precision. As this Court said in Re Munhumeso & Ors 1994 (1) ZLR 49 (S), at p 64B:“What is reasonably justifiable in cannot be precisely defined by the of reasonableness of the provision arbitrarily invades the enjoyment a democratic society is an elusive concept courts. There is no legal yardstick save that under challenge is to be judged according to of a constitutionally guaranteed right. See, one which the quality whether it generally, Commissioner of Taxes v CW (Pvt) Ltd 1989 (3) ZLR 361 (S) at 370F-372C, 1990 (2) SA 260 (ZS) at 265B-266D.” The import of these remarks is that the limitation imposed on a right should not arbitrarily infringe upon the right guaranteed in the Constitution. It is the appellant’s case that the subpoena issued in compliance with the law arbitrarily infringes upon its right to privacy. The court a quo as highlighted, made a finding that the appellants’ right to privacy is countervailed by other rights such as the first respondent’s right of access to information. This position 1s supported in Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) at para 67 where the following pronouncement was made: “The truism that no right is to be considered absolute implies that from the outset of interpretation each right is always already limited by every other right accruing to another