source of the police’s information regarding the claimant’s date of birth, his address in Loughborough, his address in London and his physical description. 18. On 18th September 2015, DC Fell made a second witness statement, in which he said: “I was present at the security office at Loughborough University on 3rd May 2010 when an informant identified the claimant by name as a potential suspect for a rape and a number of sexual assaults that had occurred on the campus. His address in Loughborough and physical description were also provided by the informant. The claimant’s date of birth and home address in London were provided by Loughborough University security personnel, Roger Kennedy, at the same time and place.” 19. Yet further directions were made by Her Honour Judge Hampton, sitting at Northampton on 31st March 2016. Soole J dismissed an application for permission to appeal by the claimant against the orders of Her Honour Judge Hampton and Recorder King, he did so on 17th March 2016. 20. On 26th April 2016, Her Honour Judge Hampton heard further applications by the claimant. Relevant to the present issue the claimant had asked her to allow the university of Loughborough to be rejoined as a defendant. She refused, saying that permission to appeal Master Yoxall’s order had been refused by Globe J. She also appeared to believe that it was a matter that Soole J had also considered, though I do not have a copy of an order directly saying as much from Soole J. 21. In effect therefore, the claimant is seeking four things: (a) permission to re-open his application for permission to appeal, which was refused by Globe J, an order to that effect would have to be made under CPR Rule 52.17; (b) permission to rely on fresh evidence, an order to that effect would have to be made under Rule 52.11.2; (c) permission to appeal Master Yoxall’s order and then; (d) permission to add two individuals, Roger Kennedy and Mr Spink as further defendants to the claim. I can postpone dealing with the addition of Mr Spink and Mr Kennedy until later in this judgment. 22. So far as the other matters are concerned, the relevant test for each, taking them in reverse order is as follows: permission to appeal will only be granted if an appeal has a realistic prospect of success or there is some other compelling reason why permission should be granted - see Rule 52.36. (2) By rule 52.11 the normal course is that the appeal is decided on the basis of the evidence which was heard before the lower court. There has to be some reason to depart from this and to allow the appellant to rely on fresh evidence. The Ladd –v– Marshall principles, while not rigid, still provide guidance in that regard, so the court would need to consider: (i) whether there was a good reason why the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence at first instance; (ii) the evidence would have had an important influence on the outcome of the matter; and (iii) the evidence must be apparently credible. (3) The jurisdiction under Rule 52.17 is an exceptional jurisdiction. It will only be exercised if it is necessary to avoid real injustice.