6 WEBER AND SARAVIA v. GERMANY DECISION the democratic order) and was permissible only if less intrusive means of investigation had no prospect of success or were considerably more difficult (section 2 of the G 10 Act). As to strategic monitoring, only the head of the Federal Intelligence Service or his deputy were entitled to lodge an application for a surveillance order. The application had to be lodged in writing, had to describe and give reasons for the nature, scope and duration of the measure and had to explain that other means of carrying out the investigations either had no prospect of success or were considerably more difficult (section 4 of the G 10 Act). 20. Restrictions on the secrecy of telecommunications were to be ordered by the Federal Minister assigned by the Chancellor or the highest authority of the Länder (in respect of applications by their Offices for the Protection of the Constitution). The order was made in writing and specified the exact nature, scope and duration of the monitoring measure. The duration of the measure was to be limited to a maximum of three months; the execution of the measure could be prolonged for a maximum of three months at a time as long as the statutory conditions for the order were met (see section 5 of the G 10 Act). 21. The monitoring measures authorised were to be carried out under the responsibility of the requesting authority and under the supervision of a staff member qualified to hold judicial office. Monitoring had to be discontinued immediately if the conditions of the monitoring order were no longer met or the measure was no longer necessary (section 7 of the G 10 Act). 22. Section 3(4) provided that the Federal Intelligence Service was to verify whether the personal data obtained by measures taken under subsection 1 of section 3 were necessary to pursue the aims laid down in that subsection. 23. The Federal Constitutional Court found that in its present version section 3(4) was incompatible with Article 10 and Article 5 § 1, second sentence, of the Basic Law. It found that the provision did not contain sufficient safeguards to guarantee that personal data which were not destroyed or deleted as being unnecessary for the purposes of the Federal Intelligence Service would be used only for the purposes which had justified their collection. Furthermore, the provision also failed to comply with the identification requirements flowing from Article 10. In addition, there were insufficient safeguards to guarantee that the Federal Intelligence Service would only use such data as were relevant for the dangers listed in section 3(1). Such safeguards should also ensure that the Federal Intelligence Service would take into account the important concerns of non-disclosure of sources and confidentiality of editorial work as protected by the freedom of the press under Article 5 § 1 of the Basic Law. The court ruled that, pending the entry into force of legislation in compliance with the Constitution, section 3(4) was to be applied only if the data were specially