26 RUBINS v. LATVIA JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION In his e-mail the applicant “proposed” as a settlement of the dispute that either he retain his post as head of department as before or receive a sizeable financial compensation for loss of post, failing which he would appeal to the courts and “make everything public”, with a reference added to “the latest news” of events which reflected badly on the management and activities of the University (see paragraph 13 of the present judgment). The ensuing notice of termination of employment (see paragraph 17 of the present judgment) for its part explained that the applicant was dismissed for what the University considered to be “blackmail” in the e-mail of 10 March 2010 in the form of threats to disseminate disparaging information concerning the University as widely and publicly as possible if the applicant did not obtain what he demanded by way of settlement. 5. It was the applicant’s conduct, assessed as contrary to the University’s regulations, namely the very fact of making threats amounting to “blackmail”, which was relied on as the reason for his dismissal, not, as the applicant claims, the expression by him of “a legitimate opinion about problems prevailing in the University” (see paragraph 52 of the judgment, summarising the applicant’s complaint to this Court) or, as the majority state, “the allegedly unethical manner of expression used by [him] in his communication with his employer”. The domestic appeal court (the Regional Court) thereafter examined and decided the dispute between the applicant and his employer on this basis (see paragraphs 22-26 of the judgment). 6. As the judgment in the present case itself also points out, while it may be that the impugned e-mail could be read as containing insults, this factor was not gone into by the domestic appeal court, which did not analyse the language used from this angle (see paragraph 91 of the judgment). 7. The majority also point out that “in reaching their conclusion about the lawfulness of the applicant’s dismissal the domestic courts relied on evidence which contained references to other activities carried out by the applicant prior to his sending the impugned mail”. From this the majority deduce that “the applicant’s prior activities in expressing criticism played some role in deciding whether the applicant’s dismissal had been lawful” (see paragraph 69 of the judgment). The domestic appeal court did indeed refer both to “other activities..., including making unfounded statements” and to the expression by the applicant of “legitimate concerns” about the reorganisation of the University and the management of its financial resources (see paragraphs 23 and 26 of the judgment). However, the incidence of such references for the exercise by the applicant of his freedom of expression was explicitly addressed by the appeal court as follows: “[The appeal court] finds that there is no evidence that prior to the letter of 20 March 2010 [the University] had obstructed the applicant’s democratic rights to inform society and the competent authorities about the alleged violations in the [University].” (see paragraph 25 of the judgment)