UNITED STATES V. MOHAMUD 49 accountability within the Executive Branch’ and provide ‘an internal check on Executive Branch arbitrariness.’” (citation omitted). However, as described above, § 702 differs in important ways from traditional FISA, and a mechanism that might provide additional protections above and beyond those already employed in a traditional FISA context provides far less assurance and accountability in the § 702 context, which lacks those baseline protections. See also Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1144–45. Accordingly, although we do not place great weight on the oversight procedures, under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the applied targeting and minimization procedures adequately protected Mohamud’s diminished privacy interest, in light of the government’s compelling interest in national security. In sum, even assuming Mohamud had a Fourth Amendment right in the incidentally collected communications, the search was reasonable. Thus, we hold that the application of § 702 did not violate the Fourth Amendment under the particular facts of this case.28 28 We also agree with the district court that the FISC survives separation of powers and non-delegation challenges, as FISC review of § 702 surveillance applications does not “interfere[] with the prerogatives of another branch of government beyond requiring the executive branch to conform to the statute,” and is “central to the mission of the judiciary” as it is similar to “the review of search warrants and wiretap applications.” See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 388 (1989). Further, we agree with the district court that FISC opinions are not advisory because the FISC either approves or denies the requested acquisition (and electronic communication service providers must follow the directives or challenge them). See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h), (i)(2). Finally, the district court correctly rejected Mohamud’s First Amendment challenge, as motions to suppress based on First Amendment violations are analyzed