MR JUSTICE WARBY Approved Judgment NT1 & NT2 v Google LLC 109. Nor can Google rely on Condition 10 of Schedule 3 and paragraph 3 of the Schedule to the Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Personal Data) Order 2000 (SI 2000/417), made by the Secretary of State pursuant to Condition 10. That condition is, in substance, a narrower version of DPA s 32. It lays down a set of requirements which are cumulative (see Campbell v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 499 (QB) [121] (Morland J)). Among the requirements are that the processing in question is “for the special purposes”, and “with a view to the publication of … data by any person”. Whatever else might be said about the application of this Condition to the facts of this case, the existence of those two requirements means that Google’s argument is unsound, for the reasons I have given in deciding the Exemption Issue. 110. The Schedule 3 condition that I do find satisfied is Condition 5: that “the information contained in the personal data has been made public as a result of steps deliberately taken by the data subject”. In reaching that conclusion I am following a path already trodden by Stephens J in Townsend v Google Inc [2017] NIQB 81, and a principle that seems to be logical, and well-established in domestic and European law. In Townsend, Stephens J refused an application for leave to serve proceedings on Google in California, claiming remedies under the DPA in respect of the processing of information about the convictions of a prolific offender. (By the age of 24 the plaintiff had accumulated 74 convictions, of which only 2 were spent). One of Stephens J’s conclusions was that Sch 3 Condition 5 was so clearly satisfied that the contrary was not arguable, so there was no triable issue. He reasoned, at [62], that “legally as a consequence of the open justice principle by committing an offence [the offender] is deliberately taking steps to make the information public”. Mr Tomlinson quarrels with this analysis. He argues that the Claimant took no steps, deliberate or otherwise, to “make the information contained in the data” public. Condition 5, he says “requires some act of dealing with information”. An offender such as NT1, who commits an offence in private, is by no means deliberately making his conduct public. I do not believe this reasoning is sound. 111. First of all, the wording of condition 5 is important. It does not require a deliberate decision or “step” by the data subject “to make” the information public, but rather (a) the taking by him of a deliberate step or steps, as a result of which (b) the information is “made public”. A person who deliberately conducts himself in a criminal fashion runs the risk of apprehension, prosecution, trial, conviction, and sentence. Publicity for what happens at a trial is the ordinary consequence of the open justice principle: “An important aspect of the public interest in the administration of criminal justice is that the identity of those convicted and sentenced for criminal offices should not be concealed. Uncomfortable though it may frequently be for the defendant that is a normal consequence of his crime”: Re Trinity Mirror plc [2008] EWCA Crim 50 [2008] QB 770 [32] (Sir Igor Judge P). The same must be true of the details of the offending, and other information disclosed in open court, including information about himself which a criminal reveals at a trial or in the course of an application. The European Court of Human Rights was making a related point, I think, in Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012) 32 BHRC [83]. The applicant complained of sanctions imposed for reporting information about a celebrity’s arrest, conviction, and sentence for possession of cocaine. Finding a violation of Article 10, the Court observed that, whilst reputation is protected by