— 12 — copies and the appellant denies that he committed the section 118(1)(f) offence because, he argues, nothing constituting such “copies”, infringing or otherwise, were distributed by him. Copies in a “material form” E.3 Mr Pun’s argument focuses on the meaning of the words “in any 37. material form” in section 23(2). He points out that the learned authors of The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs state that : “…the expression connotes two different concepts. First, it means ‘reproducing the work in any material form’ (covering changes in the form of expression)… Secondly, it means ‘reproducing the work in any material form’ (emphasising the physical nature of the reproduction)…”5 38. The first of those concepts is not relevant to this appeal. Mr Pun relies on the second. He contends that the requirement that a copy be a reproduction of a work “in a material form” means that a digital or electronic copy must be contained or stored in some “tangible physical object” which serves as a suitable storage medium for such copy. Thus, he argues, an electronic copy necessarily consists both of the bundle of digital information reproducing the work and the disk or other storage medium which incorporates that data. This is stated in the following terms in the appellant’s Supplemental Case: (a) “... the issue in this appeal is not whether a ‘copy’ can be in digital/electronic form – this question is clearly answered in the affirmative by the second part of s 23(2) – but whether a copy in 5 Laddie et al, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, Butterworths, 3rd ed (2000), §14.6.