03/02/2020 G.R. No. 203335 (iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause12 in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. For example, supposing there exists a well known billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name and another who registers the name because it happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that, considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law should recognize the difference. But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo" which happens to be his real name or use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is baseless. Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law Section 4(b)(3) provides: Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. – The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act: xxxx b) Computer-related Offenses: xxxx (3) Computer-related Identity Theft. – The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower. Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press. The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.13 But the Court acknowledged its existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc,14 it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection. Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court explained in "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon"15 the relevance of these zones to the right to privacy: Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against unreasonable searches16 and seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence.17 In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.18 The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data.19 The law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law. Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since the specific conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to acquire another’s personal data. Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information about him that could be published. But this is not the essence of identity theft that the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be intended for an illegitimate purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be regarded as a form of theft. The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender, and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.20 As such, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section. Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law Section 4(c)(1) provides: Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses.– The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act: xxxx (c) Content-related Offenses: (1) Cybersex.– The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration. Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause of the Constitution.21 They express fear that private communications of sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously."22 This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or consenting individuals. https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/feb2014/gr_203335_2014.html 5/19