case where the criminal defendant made remarks defaming the victim in the process of investigation regarding the background leading up to the arguments between the criminal defendant and the victim at a police station, and Supreme Court Decision 89Do1467 decided April 27, 1990 denied publicity in the case where the criminal defendant, a union representative, made remarks defaming the victim in the process of explaining the grounds for lake of confidence in the victim when asking persons close to the victim, a previous union representative, for cooperation with union operations. All things considered, in public relationships as well as close and personal relationships, in the case of remarks made in the process of confirming or investigating facts in relation to the business of an organization, etc., remarks made in response to those made by the other party, remarks made in the course of arguments between the parties in public proceedings such as investigation, litigation, etc., recognizing the awareness of propagation possibility of the person who made the remarks and the inward intention of admitting such risk ought to be undertaken with care. Otherwise, criminal defamation can be used as a means of preventing the confirmation and investigation of facts, response to a harmful act, justifiable acts including investigation, litigation, etc. B) Specific standards for judgment Whether there exists publicity ought to be comprehensively determined after considering the objective overall circumstances at the time of such act, including the relationship or status between the person who made the remarks and the other party or the victim, background and situation leading up to such conversations, details of the revealed facts, the manner and location in which the facts were revealed, etc., and examining whether the other party may propagate such facts to many and unspecified persons therefrom. Whether the facts were actually propagated after the remark may be deemed as a factor to be considered to determine whether the possibility of propagation existed or not, but the accidental circumstance such as whether the facts were actually propagated after the remark ought to be considered merely as a passive circumstance when determining whether publicity is recognized (see e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 81Do1023, Oct. 27, 1981; 98Do1949, Sept. 8, 1998; 99Do4579, Feb. 11, 2000).