portal site, etc. as a result of the development and universalization of mobile technology such as the Internet and smartphone, and, according thereto, defamation through information and communications networks is also rapidly growing. Such information and communications network and information distribution processes have intrinsic attributes of virtual interaction, accessibility, anonymity, connectivity, etc., and thus as information is easily stored infinitely, reproduced and delivered, defamation through an information and communications network becomes obscure in the scope and boundary of “the other party to an act,” and even though the contents including defamation is delivered to a small number of persons, a number of cases where such act per se leads to a state that many and unspecified persons can recognize occur. In particular, as for defamation through an information and communications network, as controllability of information revealed by the violator is easily lost, and the degree and scope of encroachment on the victim’s reputation resulting from fast communicability are broad, there are many cases where self-purification through an argument against and debate on expression is virtually meaningless. Therefore, with respect to defamation through an information and communications network, if the legal doctrine that the other party ought to directly recognize or publicity cannot be satisfied on the sole basis of a small number of specified other parties is asserted, its function as a criterion for resolution becomes difficult. Rather, even in the case where facts were delivered to a specific minority, examining whether the general danger of infringing an individual’s social assessment arose based on whether the facts have possibility to be propagated to many and unspecified persons as a result thereof accords with practical judgment on publicity, and can be the specific standard for restricting the scope of publicity. Such meaning of publicity ought to be applied equally in the Special Act such as the Criminal Act, Information and Communications Network Act, etc (E) Considering the harmony of legislation cases such as Section 193 of the German Criminal Code or the recommendations of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and the freedom of expression, the “public interest” stipulated in Article 310 of the Criminal Act ought to be also more widely recognized in cases of alleging genuine facts. In particular, considering that the concept of relevance to the public interest is changing with the times and public concern is also constantly changing depending on the