the conclusion of the judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on publicity as referred to in criminal defamation. For the grounds stated above, we dissent with the Majority Opinion. 5. Opinion concurring with the Majority Opinion by Justice Park Sang-ok and Justice Min You-sook A. The Dissenting Opinion unreasonably opines that the Supreme Court precedents that applied the theory of propagation possibility ought to be discarded in their entirety, but it is not reasonable. Furthermore, as the Dissenting Opinion is understood as that propagation possibility cannot be included in publicity and that this ought to be seen as “a state that many and unspecified persons can directly recognize,” not only are they inappropriate, for the standard of judgment in that the details of “directly recognizable” asserted by the Majority Opinion is unclear but also freedom of expression is not protected further when the Dissenting Opinion is followed. B. Various criticisms by the Dissenting Opinion still remain as points concerning the theory of propagation possibility in the early precedents of Supreme Court, but as the Supreme Court precedents established objective and concrete criteria for propagation possibility, developing various legal principles on limitation thereof by accepting the points as above, the theory of propagation possibility has been recognized as a firm legal doctrine. The comment of the Dissenting Opinion cannot offer valid criticism on the current precedents of the Supreme Court or stems from the misconception on the legal doctrine or the purpose on which the Majority Opinion is based. 1) The literal meaning of publicity or legislative purpose used as the basis for criticism by the Dissenting Opinion is the details that the Majority Opinion already judged or is premised on. In other words, the Majority Opinion is also the same in terms of the purpose of requiring publicity as a constituent element in criminal defamation and a sense of purpose limiting the scope of the recognition range of criminal defamation for the purpose of the harmony between publicity and the freedom of expression. However, unlike times past when criminal defamation was a means to maintain and strengthen royal authority, etc., freedom of expression in our society is now comparatively well-guaranteed as a fundamental right, an individual’s personality right is infringed undiscriminatingly and unlimitedly, and situations whereby recovery from damage become both impossible or meaningless and exacerbated as malicious and