that many or unspecified persons can recognize,” while in Germany, publicity is construed as “a state that many unspecified persons can recognize.” There are also a variety of views on the meaning of publicity in our academic world. As such, interpretation with respect to whether to adopt a requirement such as “many or unspecified” from the concept of publicity may vary, and thus interpreting the meaning of publicity as a state that many or unspecified persons can recognize “directly” as mentioned in the Dissenting Opinion cannot be assumed as the limit of interpretation on the text and language. 2) The content such as “a state to be able to directly recognize” asserted by the Dissenting Opinion is unclear, but is understood to require many or unspecified persons to exist simultaneously in a physical space at the time of the act or presuppose contact with the other party of the act However, as seen in the Majority Opinion, the conveyance of information through an information and communications network, as the distribution process easy to indefinite storage, reproduction, and conveyance of information, because of intrinsic attributes such as virtual interaction, etc., in many cases, can be evaluated as a state in which many or unspecified persons can recognize on the sole basis of the fact that such information is alleged to a small number of persons per se. Focusing on such attributes, there are also views that the meaning of publicity is construed differently or the allegation of facts per se fulfills publicity, in the academic world, in the case of defamation through an information and communications network. In the same vein, defamation through printed materials, etc. (Article 309 of the Criminal Act) has been legislated, including the content that printed materials, etc. per se publicity is not required as a constituent element depending on the nature and characteristic that printed materials, etc. per se plan on the propagation to many or unspecified persons. The problem of the Dissenting Opinion is that it does not properly regulate formidable expansibility and communicability of non-face-to-face defamation in the cyber-space of an information and communications network by requiring “face-to-face in a physical space” necessarily through the “directness” requirement of remarks. For example, we can assume a case where the first propagator can expect such propagation when a person sends an e-mail or a text message including sensitive contents related to the personal affairs of his/her superior to one colleague, and such act is repeated dozens of times consecutively after the receiving party quotes it to other