-6Question 2: Did I err in finding that D1-4 might not be aware that the questions distributed at the briefing were confidential in nature? Question 3: Did I err in finding that D1-4 might not have the requisite mens rea to dishonest gain for another? Question 4: Did I err in acquitting each of D1-4 on the facts and the evidence of this case in that such verdicts were against the evidence properly considered and assessed, and were perverse in the sense as recognized in Li Man Wai v Secretary for Justice?1 Question 5: Did I err in failing to give proper consideration to the evidence of this case and in taking irrelevant matters into account in maintaining my decision to acquit D1-4 in the review hearing? 13. The appeal came on for hearing before Deputy High Court Judge C P Pang, who delivered judgment on 6 August 2018. 2 As appears from the Stated Case none of the questions raised any issue of the proper construction of s 161(1)(c). However, after the oral hearing the Judge raised with counsel the legal question whether the charges against the four respondents were appropriate and, in particular whether their acts amounted to the actus reus of “[obtaining] access to a computer” within the meaning of s 161(1)(c). The parties made further written submissions on that point. The appellant’s submission on the law as to the scope of the actus reus of the offence was quoted by the Judge: “A person can commit the actus reus of obtaining access to computer in infinite ways, such as using a smartphone [which is now settled law a 1 2 (2003) 6 HKCFAR 466. Secretary for Justice v Cheng Ka Yee & Others [2018] HKCFI 1809.