No. 14-5123 Huff, et al. v. Spaw Page 15 Turning to the question of whether circumstances justified her expectation, the Supreme Court has long held that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate an expectation of privacy in statements that a person made under circumstances similar to Bertha Huff’s. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (finding a Fourth Amendment violation in the attachment of an eavesdropping device to a public telephone booth). Therefore, Bertha’s Huff’s expectation of privacy from interception was justified under the circumstances. Having found that Bertha Huff exhibited an expectation of privacy in her statements that was reasonable under the circumstances, we reverse the district court’s holding that she did not engage in oral communications. This does not necessarily mean that Spaw is liable, because Title III imposes liability only when a person “intentionally” uses a “device” to intercept oral communications. We leave to the district court to consider on remand whether any of Spaw’s actions, including (1) answering the phone, (2) turning up the volume, (3) transcribing notes, and (4) making an electronic recording, constituted an “intentional use of a device” to intercept Bertha Huff’s oral communications. Additionally, if James Huff had noticed that his phone was connected to an outside line two minutes before he ended the call, and Bertha Huff understood this, then Bertha would not be protected by Title III with respect to those final minutes of her conversation. C Spaw relies on Williams v. State, 507 P.2d. 1339 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973), to argue that, even if some of the conversation that she overheard constituted oral communication, she is not liable because her conduct does not qualify as “interception” under Title III. Appellee’s Br. at 23–25. In Williams, a motel manager answered a phone call from a motel room and heard a “very loud disturbance in the room including cussing fighting and calling each other names.” Id. at 1340 (internal quotation marks omitted). The manager made a tape recording of the conversation, which was introduced as evidence at the defendant’s trial for the murder of the room’s occupant. Ibid. The defendant sought to exclude the recording as an unlawful interception under Title III, and the Williams court held that “the defendant has not shown that the tape recording in question was the result of an intercept . . . [because] there was no tap on the line or interference with the normal telephone lines.” Id. at 1341 (internal quotation marks