¶ 124 JUSTICE GARMAN, dissenting: ¶ 125 Even though both parties agree a strict scrutiny analysis applies in this case, the majority concludes an intermediate level of scrutiny is the appropriate standard, finding section 11-23.5(b) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/11-23.5(b) (West 2016)) is a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction. I, however, would find the statute criminalizes the dissemination of images based on their content—“private sexual images”—and thus strict scrutiny applies. Moreover, in applying strict scrutiny, I would find the statute is neither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive means of dealing with the nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. ¶ 126 “ ‘[T]he First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.’ ” United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 716 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)). “Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, 576 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015); see also Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (noting the presumed invalidity of content-based restrictions on speech and the government’s burden of showing their constitutionality); People v. Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d 472, 476 (2003) (stating content-based restrictions on speech must survive strict scrutiny, which “requires a court to find that the restriction is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest”). The restriction on “ ‘speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.’ ” United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (quoting Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997)). ¶ 127 Contrary to the majority’s belief, the content of the image is precisely the focus of section 11-23.5. It is not a crime under this statute to disseminate a picture of a fully clothed adult man or woman, even an unflattering image obtained by the offender under circumstances in which a reasonable person would know or understand the image was to remain private and he knows or should have known - 39 -