03/02/2020 Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17 (3 April 2019) (which has now been replaced by section 2(3) of the Defamation Act 2013): “In an action for libel or slander in respect of words containing two or more distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defence of justification shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff’s reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges.” 30. At para 25, Sharp LJ said: “I can see why an issue in relation to section 5 might arise for consideration if the judge was wrong to conclude that the comments alleged the respondent had tried to kill the appellant by strangling her. In my view however, the failure of the principal argument on meaning deprives the argument on section 5 of any force that it might have had. The judge found in short that there was a real and substantial difference between the allegations made and those proved; and in my view he was entitled to reach that view on the evidence he heard. Having carefully appraised the evidence of justification and dealt with the essential points relating to that defence, the judge put the matter in this way. Though the appellant had proved some justification for the words she used, the allegations made in the comments were a significant and distorting overstatement of what had in fact occurred. His views were similarly expressed during the course of submissions. It is true that the judge found as a fact that during the course of an argument, the respondent had committed common assault at least, by placing his hand over the appellant’s mouth and putting his hand under her chin, to stop her speaking. However there is a material difference in gravity between such conduct, however unpleasant it may be, and an attempt to kill by strangulation; and it was plainly open to the judge to find, as he did, that what the appellant had proved in this and other respects, fell short by some measure of establishing a successful defence of justification, by reference to section 5 or otherwise.” 31. Again, it is to be noted that the finding of Mitting J about the meaning to be given to the words, “he tried to strangle me” was pivotal to the conclusion that section 5 could not be prayed in aid by Mrs Stocker. It is clear that, if it had been held that Mitting J was wrong to fix on the meaning of those words that he did, a markedly different view as to the applicability of section 5 would have been warranted. The single meaning rule 32. Section 11 of the Defamation Act 2013 abolished the statutory right to trial by jury (in section 69(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981). Under the previous dispensation, the judge would determine which meanings the allegedly defamatory words were capable of bearing and exclude those which she or he considered they were not capable of bearing. The judge would then put to the jury the various possible meanings and, with appropriate directions, invite the jury to decide which of those adumbrated meanings was the one to be attributed to the words said to be defamatory. https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2019/17.html 8/16