05/02/2020 Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016) the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights". These amendments were not before Stephens J when he granted leave. They constitute new causes of action. However, Stephens J was told expressly that the plaintiff was relying on the 1998 Act at the ex parte hearing. THE PRESENT APPLICATION [29] This is an application made before the defendant has entered an unconditional appearance, to discharge the Order giving leave to serve the writ on it out of the jurisdiction pursuant to Order 12 Rule 8. It would also appear that Google relies on the court's jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte order under Order 32 Rule 6 and/or under the court's inherent jurisdiction. As counsel for the plaintiff pointed out, the summons does not set out the grounds on which Google seeks to challenge the Order made by Stephens J. Similar criticisms can be levelled at the plaintiff's "ex parte notice of motion" which refers to Order 11 Rules 1(b), (c) and (f), 2, 3 and 4 which do not exist. These obvious errors (and others) should not have occurred but I will proceed on the basis of what must have been understood by the parties. The court retains an inherent jurisdiction to revoke leave given ex parte, when, for example it considers that leave was granted under a misapprehension as to the law or upon new matters being drawn to its attention: see Becker v Noel (Practice Notice) [1971] 1 WLR 803. I will return to this issue in greater detail later on in the judgment. Although regrettable, I do not consider these errors to be a fatal to Google's application, although it would have been preferable if the grounds had been set out. Similarly the plaintiff's failure to accurately specify the correct provisions it was relying on in the ex parte motion does not invalidate it. [30] The claims which had been made by the plaintiff against Google in the writ of summons were: (a) Libels and slanders. (b) Malicious falsehoods. (c) Misuse of private information. (d) Harassment under the 1997 Order. There was a claim for breach of the EU Data Protection Directive, breach of the 1998 Act and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights but these were only contained in the draft statement of claim which accompanied the application for leave. There was no mention of them in the writ of summons that had been issued. The Order made simply gives leave to serve the writ of summons on Google without specifying whether the judge had considered whether all the causes of action satisfied the various tests under Order 11. The transcript records Junior Counsel saying that, inter alia: (a) Google is guilty of libelling the plaintiff. (b) Google has been guilty of the tort of misuse of private information. (c) The plaintiff intends to rely on the Data Protection Act. (d) As part of a belt and braces approach the plaintiff seeks to rely on breach of the EU Data Protection Directive and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. [31] The trial judge acknowledged that this was a complicated claim, he reminded counsel of his duty on an ex parte application to bring to the attention of the trial judge any relevant matters. He concluded that: "The present evidence before me establishes a prima facie case under the Data Protection Legislation … and I also come to the same conclusion in relation to defamation and misuse of private information". [32] It will be noted that the writ did not seek an injunction for misuse of private information. It did seek an injunction contra mundum without specifying on what grounds the republication of the file:///Users/nerissa/Downloads/Columbia CSV/Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016).htm 7/26