Supreme Court has identified statutes as content-based restrictions "if [the] law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed." Id. (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)). The district court reasoned that "the law [under review] is plainly a content-based restriction on speech because it requires regulators to examine the content of the speech to determine whether it includes impermissible subject matter." The district court applied strict Id. scrutiny, "which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." Id. at 228 (quoting Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231). Secretary Gardner, the named defendant, asserted the prevention of vote buying and voter coercion as the State's compelling interests justifying the restriction. Id. at 231. that asserted although those two The district court found interests were "plainly compelling in the abstract," id., "neither the legislative history nor the evidentiary record compiled by the Secretary in defense of this action provide any support for the view that the state has an actual or imminent problem with images of completed ballots being used to facilitate either vote buying or voter coercion," id. at 232. And the court found that the statute was not narrowly tailored because it was "vastly overinclusive" and would, "for the most part, punish only the innocent - 10 - while leaving actual