46 CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT 159. The Court also finds that the Inspectorate’s activities are open to public scrutiny. Beyond the audit provided by the National Audit Office, the Inspectorate submits annual reports to the Government on its activities; these reports are available to the public (see paragraph 38 above). 160. As regards personal data, further supervisory functions are provided by the Data Protection Authority. The Authority has on request access to personal data that is processed, documentation on the treatment of personal data along with the security measures taken on such treatment and access to the facilities connected to the processing of personal data. If the Authority finds that personal data is or could be processed illegally, it shall take remedial action through remarks to the FRA. The Authority may also apply to an administrative court to have illegally processed personal data destroyed (see paragraph 43 above). The Authority’s supervision led to reports published in 2010 and 2016, in which some aspects of the FRA’s activities were criticised. Issues of personal data and personal integrity, however, were generally considered to have been dealt with in a satisfactory manner (paragraphs 59-60). 161. Having regard to the above, the Court finds that the supervisory elements provided by the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate and the Data Protection Authority fulfill the requirements on supervision in general. Moreover, the Parliamentary Ombudsmen and the Chancellor of Justice have general supervisory responsibilities in regard to the FRA. (viii) Notification of secret surveillance measures (α) The parties’ submissions 162. The applicant submitted that the obligation on the FRA to notify natural persons when search terms directly related to them had been used was void of any practical meaning, since notifications had never been made due to secrecy. 163. The Government confirmed that a notification had never been given by the FRA for reasons of secrecy, but submitted that this was compensated by the remedy according to which the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate could check at the request of an individual whether his or her communication had been subject to signals intelligence. (β) The Court’s assessment 164. The Court reiterates that it may not be feasible in practice to require subsequent notification in all cases. The activity or danger against which a particular series of surveillance measures is directed may continue for years, even decades, after the suspension of those measures. Subsequent notification to each individual affected by a suspended measure might well jeopardise the long-term purpose that originally prompted the surveillance. Furthermore, such notification might serve to reveal the working methods