CENTRUM FÖR RÄTTVISA v. SWEDEN JUDGMENT 51 Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate, the Parliamentary Ombudsmen and the Chancellor of Justice. In the Court’s view, the aggregate of remedies, although not providing a full and public response to the objections raised by a complainant, must be considered sufficient in the present context, which involves an abstract challenge to the signals intelligence regime itself and does not concern a complaint against a particular intelligence measure. In reaching this conclusion, the Court attaches importance to the earlier stages of supervision of the regime, including the detailed judicial examination by the Foreign Intelligence Court of the FRA’s requests for permits to conduct signals intelligence and the extensive and partly public supervision by several bodies, in particular the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate. (x) Conclusion 179. The Court is mindful of the potentially harmful effects that the operation of a signals intelligence scheme may have on the protection of privacy. Nevertheless, the Court acknowledges the importance for national security operations of a system such as the one examined in the present case. It notes, in this respect, the similar conclusions drawn by the Venice Commission (see paragraph 69 above). Having regard to the present-day threats being posed by global terrorism and serious cross-border crime as well as the increased sophistication of communications technology, the decision to set up a bulk interception regime in order to identify such threats was one which fell within the respondent State’s margin of appreciation. As noted above (paragraph 112), in deciding on the type of regime necessary, the margin afforded was a wide one. 180. As noted simultaneously, the State’s discretion in operating the interception regime is more narrow. When examining the Swedish system of signals intelligence in abstracto, the Court has had regard to the relevant legislation and the other information available in order to assess whether, on the whole, there are sufficient minimum safeguards in place to protect the public from abuse. While the above assessment has disclosed some areas where there is scope for improvement – notably the regulation of the communication of personal data to other states and international organisations (see paragraph 150 above) and the practice of not giving public reasons following a review of individual complaints (paragraphs 173 and 177) – the Court is of the opinion that the system reveals no significant shortcomings in its structure and operation. The regulatory framework has been reviewed several times, in order to expand the use of signals intelligence but also, more importantly, with the aim to enhance protection of privacy. It has developed in such a way that it minimises the risk of interference with privacy and compensates for the lack of openness. In particular, the scope of the signals intelligence measures and the treatment of intercepted data are clearly defined in law, the authorisation procedure is detailed and entrusted to a judicial body and there are several independent