¶ 18 ¶ 19 ¶ 20 ¶ 21 ¶ 22 ¶ 23 Critically, too, the concerns that are typically associated with the use of John Doe defendants, e.g., ensuring adequate notice or preventing fraud on the courts, are not present in this case. Counsel has litigated this matter on behalf of defendant since it was in the federal court, and has not disputed that Fuboy is the name defendant used. Fuboy would in no way be prejudiced by a finding that Hadley’s original complaint had legal validity. Additionally, there is no evidence defendant utilized the name Fuboy to deceive or defraud the court. Instead, defendant chose that alias as a user name on the Freeport Journal Standard’s website. Permitting Hadley’s original complaint to stand would, therefore, in no sense subvert the justice system. Under the unique facts presented here, we find that the general rule set forth in Bogseth is inapplicable. Hadley filed his claim against a real person, using a validly adopted alias chosen by the defendant. Accordingly, we reject Fuboy’s argument and conclude that Hadley’s original complaint was not a legal nullity. Whether Hadley Abandoned His Original Complaint Fuboy next contends that, even if Hadley’s original complaint had legal validity, Hadley is still not entitled to relief under Rule 224. Fuboy observes that Rule 224 contemplates the filing of a separate action prior to the commencement of any lawsuit. That being the case, Fuboy maintains that Hadley’s amended complaint, because it sought relief under Rule 224, must, as a matter of law, be viewed as asserting a stand-alone, Rule 224 action. In other words, Fuboy contends that when Hadley sought relief under Rule 224, he necessarily abandoned his original complaint and commenced a new, separate action. Continuing, Fuboy then argues that Hadley is not entitled to relief under that separate action because the statute of limitations had run on the defamation claim by the time Hadley requested his Rule 224 relief. Rule 224 states that a petitioner “may file an independent action.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 224(a)(1)(i). We agree with Fuboy that this language makes clear that a separate action is contemplated under the rule. However, we cannot agree with the remainder of Fuboy’s argument. In essence, Fuboy is contending that, because Hadley erred in pursuing Rule 224 relief after his suit was filed rather than before, he must face dismissal of his lawsuit. We note, however, that Hadley was specifically instructed by the circuit court to pursue Rule 224 in the manner that he did. Further, nothing in Rule 224 requires dismissal of Hadley’s suit. Instead, the rule is silent on the issue raised here, i.e., how to proceed when a circuit court erroneously instructs a plaintiff to proceed under Rule 224 after suit has commenced. Finally, there is no contention that the specific procedure employed here was prejudicial to Fuboy. Given these circumstances, we conclude that dismissal of Hadley’s defamation suit would be too harsh a sanction. Accordingly, we find the procedural irregularities here do not render Hadley’s Rule 224 request for relief invalid. However, having reached this conclusion, we emphasize that the proper way to invoke Rule 224 is before suit commences. Our holding here should not be read as expressing approval of the actions taken by the circuit court in this case. -5-