to “take necessary measures.” 32 This article is ill-defined and does not specify the force majeure circumstances compelling discretionary government powers to direct the operation of private companies, or what “necessary measures” may entail. This leaves this provision extremely vulnerable to misuse. It is foreseeable that this provision could be abused to temporarily shut down social networks and other internet-based services, such as messengers, as a means to inhibit social mobilization as has been the case in other repressive regimes. 33 There is precedent for such a shutdown within Cambodia; in 2007 prior to the second nationwide commune elections, the government imposed a days-long suspension of SMS services in the Kingdom to interfere with the work of election observers. 34  The existing licensing regime under government control is further entrenched and the Telecoms Law adds no appeal procedures or improvements to safeguard against arbitrary licensing decisions. Unlicensed activity is punishable by custodial sentences and extremely high financial penalties. 35 While a licensing regime is not an unusual regulatory practice in itself, within the Cambodian context the government can use these provisions to maintain control over traditional media outlets and internet service providers. Article 110 requires telecommunications operators to reapply for licenses within one year of the Telecoms Law entering into force. 36 This means the government will decide on the continued operations of television stations, radio stations and internet service providers in the run up to the 2017 commune election.  Although the TRC is obliged to provide written justifications for its decisions, the total lack of transparency over telecommunications infrastructure, for example bandwidth capacity, means there is no way of independently verifying whether TRC grounds for denial of a license are legitimate. 37  Under Article 89, any act of basic telecommunications operation 38 without a license could incur custodial sentences and heavy fines of up to 5 million riels. 39 The Telecoms Law Annex establishes an extremely broad definition of “telecommunications devices” to include any electronic device capable of communication, 40 meaning that small-scale unlicensed sale or repair of items as basic as a mobile phone or a computer could be punished by a custodial sentence. Under Article 91 the construction or operation of telecommunications infrastructure and services without a license is punishable by custodial sentences of up to three years. 41 As such, the Telecoms Law reinforces government constriction and discretionary licensing control over the use of telecommunications from an individual level up to major telecommunications infrastructure providers. Government interference and private property rights The Telecoms Law gives government bodies far reaching powers to interfere in the internal operations of private telecoms operators. There is a real risk that the provisions discussed below could be misused to convert notionally independent private firms into government proxy companies and vehicles for repressive action. 32 Telecoms Law Article 7 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/26/egypt-blocks-social-media-websites; http://www.ibtimes.com/thailand-internet-censorship-government-orders-service-providers-block-criticism-take-1770220 34 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/30/AR2007033000944.html 35 Telecoms Law Articles 14; 15; 16; 17; 18; 20; 78; 89; 91 36 Telecoms Law Article 110 37 Telecoms Law Article 20 (c) requires the TRC to provide a reasoned decision; however, there is no substantive mechanism for appeal against a refusal to license. 38 Telecoms Law Article 15 39 Telecoms Law Article 89 40 Telecoms Law Annex 41 Telecoms Law Article 17; 91 33 Page 6 of 7