MAJIEDT J on the applicant who seeks the relief and the need for the court’s caution in exercising this power obviously arise from the fact that the relief curtails a litigant’s access to court.”57 (Emphasis added.) [58] The Supreme Court of Appeal ultimately confirmed the High Court’s findings: “Mr Maphanga clearly did not habitually and persistently institute legal proceedings against the MEC and the Department. Neither was it shown as a certainty that any of his claims were ‘obviously unsustainable’.”58 [59] Maphanga is distinguishable and does not assist the applicants’ case. It plainly concerned frivolous and vexatious proceedings. Before us, the reliance on the provisions of the Act has been abandoned. Furthermore, improper motive was not in issue at all in Maphanga, since the case concerned frivolous and vexatious proceedings. The dictum relied on by the applicants therefore does not find application here. The applicants’ strong reliance on Maphanga is misconceived. It is convenient to deal next with the other cases relied upon by the applicants. Those cases mostly concern the legality of arrests and criminal prosecutions. Other cases relied upon by the applicants [60] It is immediately apparent that on the face of it, there is no discernible analogy between cases concerning arrest and criminal prosecutions and a SLAPP suit defence to a defamation claim. Self-evidently, the law has a real and direct interest in refusing to provide the means for a person who commits a crime to avoid arrest or prosecution by saying that some arresting officer or prosecutor had bad motives. As was said by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Zuma: “The motive behind the prosecution is irrelevant because, as Schreiner JA said in connection with arrests, the best motive does not cure an otherwise illegal 57 Maphanga above n 15 at para 26. 58 Id at para 28. 27