INDEX.HU ZRT v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT A. Admissibility 17. The Court notes that the application is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. B. Merits 1. The parties’ submissions 18. The applicant company submitted that J.A., as a former President of Hungary and a member of the ruling party, was a public figure and a legitimate target of criticism. The publication in question had concerned matters of public interest, namely a media campaign and the conduct of the President during his military service, and had thus enjoyed the protection afforded to political speech. The applicant company also maintained that it had acted in line with journalistic ethical standards as it had contacted the President’s office for comment and had published the President’s reaction to the article in its entirety. Moreover, the article had given a factual presentation of all the relevant circumstances, as well as of the political and societal background to the case, and had expressed doubts as to the veracity of the story. 19. The applicant company also argued that the rule of objective liability, that is, holding media outlets liable for statements clearly emanating from third parties, as applied to its case, was contrary to the Court’s case-law under Article 10. 20. The Government contended that the domestic courts had provided relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the interference with the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression. 21. They argued that the statements in question had not concerned a matter of public interest because they had not related to the public performance or conduct of the President. The publication of the statements had simply constituted the dissemination of false information and an infringement of the personality rights of a public figure. The Government submitted that a person using offensive and hurtful statements to humiliate others was not exercising his or her right to freedom of expression. Similarly, the assertion of a fact capable of constituting defamation did not enjoy the protection of freedom of expression if the speaker was either aware of the falsity of his or her statements or was not aware of it owing to his or her failure to exercise the diligence required by his or her profession. 22. Under domestic law, a person spreading false statements had to be held objectively liable. The applicant company could have relied on its right to freedom of expression only if it had been unaware of the falsity of the information. In any event, the applicant company had published the statement 5